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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Corwin was tried by a jury and found guilty of driving under the influence.
Following a bench trial, he was also found guilty of the felony enhancements alleged by
the State. Although the district court ordered that a substance abuse evaluation be
performed for purposes of sentencing, no such evaluation was ever received. The
district court sentenced Mr. Corwin to 10 years, with five years fixed.
Mr. Corwin timely appealed, and asserted that the district court improperly
admitted opinion testimony from two law enforcement officers that invaded the province
of the jury because this testimony embraced the ultimate question of Mr. Corwin's guilt
of the charged offense. He further asserted that the prosecutor committed misconduct
that rose to the level of fundamental error when she expressed her personal opinion of
Mr. Corwin's guilt during closing argument. Finally, Mr. Corwin asserted that the district
court manifestly disregarded ldaho Criminal Rule (hereinafter, I.C.R.) 32 when it
sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of the substance abuse evaluation that was
ordered in this case and required by statute, and further abused its discretion when it
denied Mr. Corwin's ldaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting
that such an evaluation be performed.
In response, the State claimed that the testimony of the officers as to their
opinion regarding Mr. Corwin's guilt was not objectionable simply because it embraced
an ultimate issue; that Mr. Corwin's claims regarding this testimony were not preserved
for appeal; that, in any case, the district court properly exercised its discretion in
admitting the testimony; and that any error that may exist was harmless. Regarding

Mr. Corwin's assertion of prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental
error, the State asserted that, if the transcript of proceedings is altered so that two
sentences are made into one sentence, then there was no comment by the prosecutor
as to her personal opinion of Mr. Corwin's guilt. Alternatively, the State asserted that
any error as to the challenge statements was not fundamental.

Finally, the State

claimed that Mr. Corwin, not the district court, had the obligation to provide a substance
abuse evaluation for purposes of sentencing. The State did not address Mr. Corwin's
Rule 35 motion in which he challenged his sentence, infer alia, in light of the absence of
a substance abuse evaluation.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the claims raised by the State on
appeal.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Corwin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1.

Did the State's questions regarding whether law enforcement officers believed
that Mr. Corwin was intoxicated impermissibly invade the province of the jury?

2.

Did the prosecutor's closing remarks at sentencing regarding the prosecutor's
personal belief in the guilt of the defendant constitute prosecutorial misconduct?

3.

Did the district court manifest disregard I.C.R. 32 when it sentenced Mr. Corwin
without the benefit of the substance abuse evaluation that was ordered for
purposes of sentencing, and further abuse its discretion when it denied
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion that requested such evaluation be actually
performed?

ARGUMENT

The State's Questions Regardins Whether Law Enforcement Officers Believed That
Mr. Corwin Was lntoxicated lmpermissiblv lnvaded The Province Of The Jury
A.

Introduction
Mr. Corwin has asserted on appeal that the admission of expert testimony of

several police officers as to their opinion regarding Mr. Corwin's guilt impermissibly
invaded the province of the jury and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted this testimony over Mr. Corwin's objection. Expert testimony that goes
to the ultimate question of the defendant's guilt or innocence has been recognized as
improper under Idaho case law interpreting the rules of evidence. Mr. Corwin has not
challenged the underlying qualifications of the officers in this case to testify as experts,
but rather has challenged the subsfance of that testimony. And admission of this
testimony was not harmless in light of the record in this case.
B.

The State's Questions Reqardinq Whether Law Enforcement Officers Believed
That Mr. Corwin Was lntoxicated lmpermissibl~lnvaded The Province Of The

Jun/
The State has made several contentions in relation to Mr. Corwin's claim that the
testimony of multiple police officers as to their expert opinion regarding Mr. Corwin's
intoxication, and therefore his guilt, impermissibly invaded the province of the jury. The
State has claimed:

(1) that, "[ulnder Idaho's rules of evidence, the only improper

invasion of the province of the jury is where one witness passes upon the credibility of
other witnesses"; (2) that, at trial, Mr. Corwin only objected to the officers' testimony as
invading the province of the jury, and therefore there was no objection on the basis that

this testimony was improper expert testimony or that the officers were not properly
qualified as experts; (3) that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
testimony in light of the holding in Stafe v. Gleason, 123 ldaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992)
and Stafe

V.

Burrow, 142 ldaho 328, 127 P.3d 231 (Ct. App. 2005); and (4) that any

error in admitting this testimony is harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-15.) Mr. Corwin
will address each contention in turn.
First, it is an incorrect statement of law that, "Under Idaho's rules of evidence, the
only improper invasion of the province of the jury is where one witness passes upon the
credibility of other witnesses." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) One need look no further than
the very first case cited by the State in support of this proposition to determine that it is
an erroneous statement of the law.
The State relies on Sfafe v. Hesfer, 114 ldaho 688, 760 P.2d 27 (1988), as one
of two cases in support of the idea that the only way that expert testimony can invade
the province of the jury is by an express comment on the credibility of another witness.
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.)

However, the actual holding in Hesfer was that expert

testimony impermissibly invaded the province by expressing an opinion as to the
defendant's guilt of the charged offense

- which

is the same issue being raised by

Mr. Corwin in this appeal with regards to the challenged testimony of the officers.
Hesfer, 114 ldaho at 695-696, 760 P.2d at 34-35. (See also Appellant's Brief, pp.1218.) Specifically, the Court in Hesfer held:
In the instant case, expert opinion testimony regarding Hesfer's idenfify as
the abuser only served to impermissibly evaluafe fhe circumstances and
render the same conclusion the jury was asked to render by ifs verdicf.
Therefore, the testimony of Jones and Sorini on this issue, the ultimate
issue of whether Hester was [the alleged victim's] abuser, was improperly
admitted.

Id. at 696, 760 P.2d at 35 (emphasis added). It is abundantly clear from the holding in

Hesferthat expert testimony may constitute an impermissible invasion of the province of
the jury where that opinion constitutes a comment on the ultimate issue of the
defendant's guilt. The State's assertion to the contrary is meritless.
Second, the State correctly notes that there was no objection at trial to the
officers' personal qualifications as expert witnesses, and therefore this issue is not
preserved for appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) This assertion would be relevant if
this was the claim that Mr. Corwin had raised on appeal, but it is not. Mr. Corwin's
assertion regarding the improper admission of the expert testimony was based upon the
subsfance of the testimony as an invasion of the province of the jury, and not on the
qualifications of the officers. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-18.) And, as previously noted, it
is indisputable that one of the bases being asserted in Hesfer for the inadmissibility of
the expert testimony was that this testimony embraced the ultimate issue of the
defendant's guilt. While there were other issues raised as to why the expert testimony
was improperly admitted, the Court in Hesfer made clear that one of the issues
regarding the admission of the expert testimony was "the trial court's admission of
Jones's and Sorini's expert opinion testimony that Hester was [the alleged victim's]
abuser." Hesfer, 114 Idaho at 695, 760 P.2d at 34. It is further apparent that the
admission to the expert testimony under I.R.E. 702 can be objected to on the basis that
the testimony invades the province of the jury from the following language in Hesfer:
Although the field of child abuse may be "beyond common experience,"
having an expert render an opinion as to the identity of .the abuser is more
of an invasion o f fhe jury's funcfion rather than an "assist" to the trier of
fact. I.R.E. 702.

Id. Two things are of note from the above quoted passage: (1) the pertinent holding

from Hesferwas based on an assertion that the expert testimony was improper because
it invaded upon the province of the jury; and (2) the assertion of improper expert
testimony on the basis that it invades the province of the jury is a claim that is firmly
rooted in the defined limits of expert testimony as outlined in I.R.E. 702.
Contrary to the State's apparent assumption, an allegation that expert testimony
was improperly admitted can embrace grounds other than just the qualifications of the
witness as an expert. And Mr. Corwin has clearly preserved his argument that the
testimony of the officers was improper expert witness testimony because it invaded on
the province of the jury.
Third, the State's reliance on Gleason and Burrows to argue that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony is misplaced. First, the
issue being resolved by the Court in Gleason was whether the district court erred in
admitted evidence of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (hereinafter, HGN) test
administered on the defendant. Gleason, 123 Idaho at 65-66, 844 P.2d at 694-695.
More specifically, the defendant objected to the admissibility of the HGN test because it
lacked a sufficient foundation of scientific reliability to be presented to the jury as
evidence of intoxication. Id. There was no challenge raised in Gleason to the testimony
of the officer as to a personal belief that the defendant was too intoxicated to drive on
the basis that this invaded the province of the jury. Id. This was simply not an issue
presented for the Gleason Court's resolution. Therefore, any similarity to the expert
opinion testimony of the officers in Gleason and the officers in this case is irrelevant,

since no issue in Gleason was raised as to the propriety of that testimony. ld. at 64-66,
844 P.2d at 693-695.
Additionally, as has been noted in the Appellant's Brief, the Court of Appeals
decision in Burrow did not address the same issue as Mr. Corwin has presented on
appeal. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) But this opinion did discuss, in dicta, the distinction
between expert opinion testimony that indicates a defendant's behavior is consistent
with intoxication and opinion testimony that a person is, in fact, intoxicated. Burrow, 142
Idaho at 331, 127 P.3d at 234. As Mr. Corwin has previously noted in his Appellant's
Brief, the discussion of this distinction in Burrow is dicta that was discussed in the
context of a different issue. (Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

But the distinction made by

Burrow is nonetheless relevant and instructive in this case, where this difference
between testimony that opines as to the defendant's acfual intoxication, versus
testimony of whether there were indications consistent with intoxication, is squarely
before this Court.
Finally, this error was not harmless for the reasons set forth in the Appellant's
Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.)

II.
The Prosecutor's Closing Remarks At Sentencing Reaarding The Prosecutor's Personal
Belief In The Guilt Of The Defendant Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
The State has asserted that the prosecutor's remarks expressing a personal

belief in Mr. Corwin's guilt do not, in fact, express the prosecutor's personal opinion
when taken in context. However, the "context" asserted by the State is predicated on

an alteration of the transcript so that two sentences become one sentence, and the
statement of the prosecutor becomes attributed to a witness. Because there is no
authority providing for the State to unilaterally alter the record so as to support a claim
on appeal, this argument is without merit. In fact, the State has not filed a motion
pursuant to I.A.R. 30.1 to alter or correct the transcript. Therefore, on the record before
this Court, the prosecutor's statement is clear and unambiguous, and constitutes an
opinion regarding Mr. Corwin's guilt of the charged offense.
B.

The Prosecutor's Closing Remarks At Sentencing Regardinq The Prosecutor's
Personal Belief In The Guilt Of The Defendant Constituted Prosecutorial
Misconduct
In this case, Mr. Corwin has asserted on appeal that the prosecutor's statement

expressing her personal belief in Mr. Corwin's guilt constituted prosecutorial misconduct
that rose to the level of a fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-23.) The State
has responded that, given the proper context, the prosecutor's remarks can be
interpreted as merely playing the role of the officers in this case and expressing the
officer's belief that Mr. Corwin was guilty. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) However, in
doing so, the State urges this Court to alter the plain terms of the transcript so that the
prosecutor's statement, "Based in my opinion I believe Mr. Corwin was too -was under
the influence and too impaired to drive a motor vehicle," becomes a part of the previous
sentence dealing with the opinion of Officer Pittz, rather than standing on its own as is
reflected in the transcript. (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) The State further argues that
Mr. Corwin has not demonstrated fundamental error based on this same assertion of
the context to apply to the prosecutor's remarks. The State's argument focuses on how
to interpret this statement "if the punctuation were different," but the transcript as

produced in the record does not bear out the State's assertion. (Respondent's Brief,
p. 17.)
This Court does review allegations of prosecutoriai misconduct based on the
statements of the prosecutor in light of the context out of which the statements
emerged. See, e.g., State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003).
However, the State has cited no authority for the proposition that this Court may
generate a context by altering the transcript so as to merge two separate statements
into one single sentence; and further modify the transcript so a statement presented in
the first person is actually a quotation from another witness. And a party waives an
argument on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996).
Moreover, such a unilateral alteration disregards the requirements of I.A.R. 30.1,
which establishes the required procedure for amendment or correction of the transcript
or record on appeal. Under I.A.R. 30.l(b), a party may file a motion for the correction of
a statement in a transcript by filing a motion in accordance with Rule 32. I.A.R.30.l(b).
Rule 32 requires that a brief statement be provided in support of the motion and that
service be made on all parties to the appeal. I.A.R. 32(d). The State has filed no such
motion with this Court, nor provided a statement in support of altering the transcript.
Therefore, it would be improper for this Court to affirmatively alter the transcript in this
case so as to create the context that the State is urging on appeal. And, under the plain
language of the transcript, the prosecutor was adding her personal opinion to the
opinions already presented of the officers as to Mr. Corwin's guilt. This constitutes

prosecutorial misconduct that rises to the level of a fundamental error. (See Appellant's
Brief, pp.18-23.)

The District Court Acted In Manifest Disreaard Of I.C.R. 32 When It Sentenced
Mr. Corwin Without The Benefit Of The Substance Abuse Evaluation That Was Ordered
For Purposes Of Sentencin~,And Further Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 Motion That Re~uestedSuch Evaluation Be Actuallv Performed
A.

Introduction
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(9) and I.C.R. 32(f), the district court was required to

order and obtain a substance abuse evaluation for purposes of sentencing. The plain
language of I.C. § 18-8005(9) creates an obligation on the part of the court to obtain
such evaluation for purposes of sentencing. Mr. Corwin specifically requested that this
evaluation be performed in his Rule 35 motion, and considered by the court for
purposes of examining its sentencing decision in this case. The district court failed to
even address this request in its order denying Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion, and the
State has similarly ignored Mr. Corwin's request in his Rule 35 motion in its arguments
on appeal. In light of the statutory requirements, the district court acted in manifest
disregard of the requirements of I.C.

5 18-8005(9) and I.C.R. 32(f) when it failed to

obtain a substance abuse evaluation for purposes of sentencing; and also abused its
discretion when it denied Mr. Corwin's request for this evaluation in his Rule 35 motion.

B.

The District Court Acted In Manifest Disreaard Of I.C.R. 32 When It Sentenced
Mr. Corwin Without The Benefit Of The Substance Abuse Evaluation That Was
Ordered For Purposes Of Sentencing
The State has asserted on appeal that, once a substance abuse evaluation is

ordered, it is the defendant's responsibility to get that evaluation. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.20-21.) However, the State has cited to no language from I.C. § 18-8005 in support
of this proposition. What is clear is that these reports are deemed mandatory for use at
sentencing unless the court waives the requirement of the report based upon specified
conditions, none of which are present here. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26.) And, in
any case where a substance abuse evaluation is not before the district court at
sentencing, under the terms of I.C.

3

18-8005(9), treatment shall be presumed to be

necessary, and none was ordered in this case. (Sentencing Tr., p.15, L.9 - p.17, L.2.;
Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26.) Additionally, the State has not addressed whether the
district court's failure to acquire a substance abuse evaluation in this case constitutes
manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 in light of the contents of, and omissions within, the
presentence report. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.24-27.)
More important for this Court, the record in this case clearly shows that
Mr. Corwin had made efforts at obtaining a substance abuse evaluation which were not
fruitful due to his status as being incarcerated. At the time the substance abuse
evaluation was ordered, the prosecutor clarified for the district court that Mr. Corwin was
incarcerated, and that the evaluator should be informed of that so that the evaluator
would know that special arrangements may be needed to perform the evaluation.
(Parts II & I11 Tr., p.43, L.22 - p.44, L.3.) Given that Mr. Corwin was incarcerated during
the time between the ordering of the substance abuse evaluation and his sentencing, he

lacked the opportunity to control where and when the substance abuse evaluation
would occur.
Additionally, the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) reflects that
Mr. Corwin had brought up the fact that a substance abuse evaluation had not been
performed to the presentence investigator. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Corwin's sole purpose in
doing so can only be reasonably interpreted as an attempt to rectify the absence of the
report, and demonstrates that he was attempting through the resources available to him
to make such a report available to the district court. The presentence report itself
states, "INSERT DRUG ALCOHOL EVALUATION," which is yet another signal to the
district court for the need of this evaluation for purposes of sentencing. (PSI, p.15.)
To clarify the nature of Mr. Corwin's assertions, he is not herein asserting that a
defendant may be ordered to participate in a substance abuse evaluation where the
defendant has asserted his or her Fifth Amendment rights. Indeed, the district court
could not do so based upon applicable law. See Esfrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 563564, 149 P.3d 833, 838-839 (2006); State v. Banbury, 145 ldaho 265, 270, 178 P.3d
630, 635 (Ct. App. 2007). However, under the narrow facts of this case, where the
defendant has affirmatively indicated a willingness to participate in, and a desire for, a
substance abuse evaluation for purposes of sentencing, and the record affirmatively
indicates the need for this report, the district court is under a duty pursuant to I.C. 188005(9) and I.C.R. 32 to obtain a substance abuse evaluation for use at sentencing.
In light of the record in this case, and in particular the information contained
within and omitted from the presentence report in this case, the district court acted in

manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 when it sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of a
substance abuse evaluation
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Corwin's Rule 35
Motion That Requested That The Substance Abuse Evaluation Be Actuallv
Performed
Mr. Corwin asked for a substance abuse evaluation to be performed for purposes

of sentencing in his Rule 35 motion, and noted that he asked for such an evaluation
during his interview with the presentence investigator. (R., p.129.) The district court did
not even acknowledge this component of Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion in its order
denying this motion. (R., pp.135-137.) It has been recognized that the failure of the
district court to acquire necessary evaluations for purposes of sentencing can be a
basis for relief pursuant to a Rule 35 motion. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 822825, 186 P.3d 676, 678-681 (Ct. App. 2008). (See also Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.)
Under the record in this case, and in light of applicable legal standards, the
district court had an obligation to obtain a substance abuse evaluation for purposes of
sentencing. And Mr. Corwin properly requested a substance abuse evaluation in his
Rule 35 motion, although the court never acknowledged his request. In light of this, the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion seeking to have
such evaluation performed for purposes of sentencing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Corwin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and sentence and remand this case for a new trial. In the alternative, Mr. Corwin asks
that this Court vacate the district court's sentence and remand this case to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing upon completion and submission of an appropriate
substance abuse evaluation.
DATED this 5'hday of May, 2009.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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